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Abstract
We use the entrepreneurial ecosystem perspective to study political entrepreneur-
ship as a form of alignment between disruptive and unproductive entrepreneurs with 
authorities aiming to get privileged access to resources. Political entrepreneurship 
(PE) has emerged as a phenomenon in transition and developing economies and 
may compromise the entrepreneurial ecosystem (EE) objectives. Combining inter-
view and survey data, this study provides an in-depth assessment of entrepreneurial 
ecosystems in a transition economy and the role that political entrepreneurs play in 
moderating the effect of resources on the quality of entrepreneurship. Our findings 
are generalizable to other transition and developing economies as we demonstrate 
what various configurations of factors increase stakeholders’ perception about EE 
and directly affect its quality. Our findings reveal that stakeholders appreciate the 
evolution trends towards mature and productive entrepreneurship, but the progress is 
slow, nonlinear, with setbacks, still seriously threatened by corruption, lack of com-
petence, and the interference of the political factor as well as regional differences. 
This study offers implications on how to adopt a place-based and holistic approach 
to institutional reforms when policymakers aim at creating productive entrepre-
neurial ecosystems. This study implications are in the adoption of a place-based and 
holistic approach to institutional reforms when policymakers aim at creating produc-
tive entrepreneurial ecosystems. While political entrepreneurship may significantly 
distort an ecosystem, this study offers recommendations to managers and policy-
makers who plan to start a business in an environment with weak institutions and the 
rule of law.
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Introduction
In Schumpeter’s (1934) study, innovation and entrepreneurship are intimately 
connected. Yet, only a minority of entrepreneurs introduce new to market prod-
ucts, and entrepreneurs differ widely in terms of their economic impact (Baumol, 
1990; Weitzel et al., 2010; Autio et al., 2014). In this study, we build on Baumol’s 
theory of productive and unproductive entrepreneurship, postulating a mechanism 
to connect entrepreneurial behavior and resources available within an ecosystem 
with the entrepreneurial ecosystem performance and, therefore, potentially with 
an economic impact.
Entrepreneurship ecosystems (EEs) is often called a “new buzzword” among 
researchers and managers (Spigel & Harrison, 2018; Brown & Mason, 2017) or 
“word du jour” (Lowe & Feldman, 2017) and the latest industrial policy “block-
buster” (Brown & Mawson, 2019). However, moving ecosystem from a buzzword 
to an instrument of regional economic development (Audretsch & Belitski, 2021) 
needs a more systematic approach, “to both aid regions in building an effective 
entrepreneurial ecosystem, but also to identify when such developments might 
not be feasible” (Spigel et al., 2020: 487), as as well as to understand how entre-
preneurship type (Baumol, 1990; Stam et al., 2011) e.g., unproductive vs. produc-
tive entrepreneurship can impede or facilitate the outcome of EE.
While prior research that focused on the assessment of framework and systemic 
conditions for entrepreneurial aspirations and growth-orientation of entrepreneurs 
(Stam et al., 2011; Acs et al., 2013; Kolvereid & Isaksen, 2017; Mthanti & Ojah, 
2017), there has been a lack of research on factors that may threaten the quality 
of the ecosystem, in particular, the effect of unproductive and destructive entrepre-
neurship behavior of stakeholders (Desai & Acs, 2007; Desai et al., 2013) which in 
transition and emerging economies has been known as “political entrepreneurship”.
Drawing on the entrepreneurial ecosystem framework (Isenberg, 2010; 
Audretsch & Belitski, 2017; Bosma et al., 2018) we argue that the rent-seeking 
behavior of some economic agents may challenge the potential of the free-mar-
ket mechanisms and reduce the productivity of an entrepreneurial ecosystem as a 
whole. The gap in the literature persists.
This paper’s purpose is to contribute to the institutional and entrepreneurship 
literature by demonstrating how destructive entrepreneurs who align with cor-
rupt policymakers for “political entrepreneurship” may distort the EE. Political 
entrepreneurship as an institutional phenomenon has been particularly under-
researched in developing and transition countries where “political entrepre-
neurship” has emerged as a new transition to the market phenomenon. In doing 
so, we bring together previous research on corruption and entrepreneurship 
(Chowdhury et al., 2015; Belitski et al., 2016) and formal and informal institu-
tions in the entrepreneurial ecosystem (Brown & Mason, 2017; Stam & Van de 
Ven, 2020).
Political entrepreneurship is a regional issue in emergent economies – espe-
cially in post-communist countries where a significant number of former “appa-
ratchiks” - clerks with strategic positions in the administration or in the secret 
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services, have built a system of ambiguous and elliptic legislation rapidly, engi-
neering a privileged system that allows to tackle the “market” economy and use 
strong social ties to achieve economic goals. This type of entrepreneurship unfa-
vorably influences entrepreneurial activity and economic growth (Shleifer & 
Vishny, 1993; Kaufmann & Siegelbaum, 1997).
Thinking of the most appropriate unit of analysis for this study, we embrace 
and emphasize that the emergence of entrepreneurial ecosystems comes not just 
from the recognition that places matters for entrepreneurs but also that entrepre-
neurs matter for the place (Bosma & Sternberg, 2014). Prior empirical studies 
confirmed that the location is important for examining EEs (Spigel, 2017; Ville-
gas-Mateos, 2020). Therefore, in this study, we focus on the regional aspects of 
EE analysis from the city perspective rather than regional industrial clusters or 
national EEs (Autio et al., 2014).
The entrepreneur is a member of a community, of a system, of an environ-
ment from which they receive substance and must contribute. Most important: the 
entrepreneur must design a strategy that makes it viable for her or his business, or 
he or she wouldn’t have a business at all.
This study is also a call to policymakers to focus on city-regions, where spe-
cific resources and strengths can be allocated and capitalized (Katz & Bradley, 
2013). This is because national-level data could hide a great deal of variation 
between city-regions (Spigel et  al., 2020). We should consider the cities as the 
most appropriate EE research units (Bosma & Sternberg, 2014; Content et  al., 
2019).
Our study makes two important contributions to regional entrepreneurship litera-
ture. First, we introduce the concept of “political entrepreneurship” to the entrepre-
neurship ecosystem and examine empirically how political entrepreneurs may dis-
tort the macrosystems in transition economies with links to politicians consistently 
influence EE stakeholders’ performance and access to resources. We demonstrated 
how EE pillars are moderated by political entrepreneurship as a set of formal and 
informal institutions in the process of value creation and securing the competitive 
advantage of the entire EE.
Second, we addressed the gap in research on EEs in transition economies that 
western scholars have overlooked, particularly the role of the institutional context 
in growth-orientation and quality of EE. We demonstrated that differences in insti-
tutional arrangements in transitional economies and their preserved communist leg-
acy (Fan et  al., 2019) have significantly affected how EE is created, develop, and 
function.
The framework developed in this study can be used to expand what we know 
about EE in transition economies and the perspective of entrepreneurs that not only 
positively contribute to growth (productive entrepreneurs) but within the spec-
trum of political entrepreneurship as an element of EE in developing and transition 
economies. Our results demonstrate how a variety of ecosystem characteristics may 
affect its quality as well the role of political entrepreneurship and corruption moder-
ating this relationship. We demonstrated that political entrepreneurship and corrup-
tion had been institutionalized (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2006) in the context of the transi-
tion economy.
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The subsequent sections are structured as follows. In the next section, existing 
research on EEs is reviewed. Third Section introduces the context of Romania as a 
transition economy. Fourth Section describes the data and methodology we used. 
Fifth Section presents qualitative and quantitative results, while Sixth Section dis-
cusses them and concludes by suggesting directions for further research.
Literature review
An entrepreneurial ecosystem framework
We start by discussing the role that economic actors and entrepreneurs play in the 
ecosystem (Brown & Mason, 2017; Stam & Van de Ven, 2020) and their contribu-
tion to entrepreneurial outcomes (Stam, 2018; Audretsch et al., 2019a).
Recent research has focused on EE, highlighting the role that local and institu-
tional contexts play for entrepreneurs (Malecki, 2018; Audretsch et  al., 2019b; 
Bogers et  al., 2019). EE embraces research on the geography of entrepreneurship 
from a systemic perspective (Audretsch & Belitski, 2017; Acs et al., 2017; Theodo-
raki and Messeghem, 2017; Spigel & Harrison, 2018; Szerb et al., 2019; Miles & 
Morrison, 2018). The approach has changed since it was first introduced by Iansiti 
and Levien (2004), Isenberg (2010), and Feld (2012), which now includes additional 
pillars and the role that combinations of different factors and motives for entrepre-
neurs play in EE (Audretsch et al., 2019a; Kremer, 2019).
As Moore (1993) understood, an ecosystem consists of an active relationship 
between a considerable number of its inhabitants. Their continuous interactions 
make life possible and evolving in that very particular environment, associating the 
behavior of an entrepreneurial conglomerate confined in a region, including vari-
ous actors connected in complex relationships (Godley et al., 2019). The interesting 
point we would like to make that any actions that are carried out against the natural 
ways in the ecosystem and that do not facilitate its natural growth path are doomed 
to fail – sooner or later.
Observing natural systems (Moore, 1993), we can understand the right paradigm 
of evolution, with all its setbacks, failures or the happy-endings. Both categories 
that we compare are essentially systems: therefore, they obey the universe’s laws: 
the thermodynamic laws (about energy and entropy), its statistic, and philosophic 
principles. Both are open systems, with fuzzy borderlines; they overlap continuously 
with other systems, exchanging information.
To better understand, the EE concept is the subject of much debate among net-
work researchers, urban economists, systems theorists and cluster researchers (Autio 
et al., 2014; Pugh et al., 2019). At the same time, Spigel and Harrison (2018) state 
that an entrepreneurial ecosystem is “a unique domain, distinct from related work 
on clusters and regional innovation systems” (Spigel & Harrison, 2018: 152). While 
many researchers would call it “old wine in new bottles concept” (Stam, 2018), eco-
systems this is what Porter (1998) would call clusters that focus on “geographic con-
centrations” of companies, suppliers, service providers, and firms and institutions in 
related industries, who can be both be competitors and partners.
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Entrepreneurship ecosystems are often perceived as regional innovation systems 
(Autio et al., 2014), which is a different phenomenon and is generally referred to as 
a regional network of institutions that link “knowledge production” in academia and 
other agents of research with firms that innovate, increasing, in the end, a region’s 
overall innovativeness (Nicotra et al., 2017; Spigel & Harrison, 2018).
Depending on the ecosystem’s stage (Szerb et  al., 2019), there are many types 
of EEs, and simple analysis of them shows that there is considerable heterogeneity 
in the way specialists perceive but especially define EEs. While some underline the 
power of interrelationships and inter-conditioning between different factors, actors, 
and processes (Isenberg, 2011; Brown & Mason, 2017; Audretsch & Belitski, 2017), 
others emphasize the importance of key elements (Roundy et  al., 2017; Spigel, 
2016). For instance, in Spigel’s view, “ecosystems represent the regional economic, 
social and cultural environment within a region that provides support and resources 
for growth-oriented entrepreneurs” (Spigel, 2016: 142), and Stam considers EEs as 
a “set of interdependent actors and factors coordinated in such way that they enable 
productive entrepreneurship” (Stam, 2015: 1765). This statement raises an impor-
tant question of whether productive entrepreneurship - as Baumol (1990) would 
understand - is necessary for EE to exist. Would EE exist by satisfying needs for 
both necessity and opportunity entrepreneurs, productive and unproductive entrepre-
neurs? There has been no research and no answer to this question.
These tensions raise a significant criticism about the definitions of EE and its 
sustainability and public support to EE. Kuckertz (2019) argues the understand-
ing of EE is still “vague and opaque”; other limit EEs to geographic boundaries of 
cities (Audretsch & Belitski, 2017), which makes it difficult to assess and measure 
EEs (Brown & Mason, 2017). In most studies, the entrepreneurial ecosystem is con-
sidered “a spatially, relationally and socially embedded phenomenon” (Brown & 
Mawson, 2019: 3). Hence some recent research specialists claim that the EE is not 
a coherent theory but rather a “conceptual umbrella” comprising a plethora of per-
spectives on entrepreneurship geography (Spigel, 2016).
We agree that the “optimal” “system of entrepreneurship” has as its main function 
the development of entrepreneurial activities, entrepreneurial growth, productivity, 
job creation as well as discovery and exploitation of entrepreneurial opportunities 
for (regional) economic development (Audretsch & Lehman, 2005; Feldman, 2014). 
It is part of a general trend to conceive innovation processes as systematic processes 
involving many – connected – actors, institutions, and processes (Acs et al., 2014).
The methodology to study EE is also very different. For instance, the research by 
Neck et al. (2004) refers to EE as the Boulder region in Colorado, while Cohen (2006) 
concentrates on Victoria, British Colombia. While case studies allow going in-depth of 
ecosystem nature, an increasing number of studies examine EEs matching the theoreti-
cal to empirical perspective; most studies apply a quantitative approach using the data-
bases from the Global Entrepreneurship and Development Institute (Kremer, 2019), 
from the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (Szerb et al., 2013; Simmons et al., 2019) 
or Eurostat (Bruns et al., 2017; Audretsch & Belitski, 2017). For example, empirical 
data show stark differences among regions and within countries and regions in Europe 
in the number of start-ups or businesses’ growth (Fritsch & Storey, 2014).
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Although there is a great diversity of approaches in defining the entrepreneurial 
ecosystem concept, there is some consensus on key elements. Thus, Isenberg (2011) 
proposed a model consisting of elements grouped into six domains: policy, finance, 
culture, human capital, infrastructural support, and markets.
Spigel (2017) suggests that EE’s elements could be categorized as cultural, social, 
or material. Another approach is Brown and Mason (2017), who propose a taxonomy 
featuring four main coordinative aspects of EEs: entrepreneurial actors, entrepreneur-
ial resource providers, entrepreneurial connectors, and entrepreneurial culture. How-
ever, some researchers claim that despite the advancement of the existing literature in 
understanding ecosystems, it is still extremely different to measure them (Theodoraki 
& Messeghem, 2017). Others attribute this to the fact that both “inputs” and “out-
puts” cannot be defined accurately, and at the same time, there are multiple relations 
between input and output, creating multiple outputs (Audretsch et al., 2018).
Understanding entrepreneurial economies as complex systems
Entrepreneurship plays a double role: it is the output variable in the geography 
of entrepreneurship literature, and it is the input variable in the economic growth 
literature. To complicate matters even more, entrepreneurship and economic 
growth also affect the inputs of the geography of entrepreneurship, for example, 
with serial entrepreneurs becoming venture capitalists and creating networks, 
building on complex systems approaches (Arthur, 2013; Roundy et  al., 2017; 
Stam & Van de Ven, 2020).
Starting from the model proposed by Brown and Mason (2017), we can see how 
each pillar (element) of the ecosystem adds to its complexity. An EE perspective is 
a complex perspective integrating the geography of entrepreneurship and the insti-
tutional literature. We build on the integrative model of entrepreneurial ecosystems 
by Brown and Mason (2017) and Stam and Van de Ven (2020), which includes 
institutional arrangement and resources, endowment elements that will enable us 
to construct the EE index, that can be used for an ecosystem independently on its 
growth orientation or entrepreneurial ambition. This is to say we focus on the four 
key mechanisms of interdependencies between EE elements suggested by Brown 
and Mason (2017).
Entrepreneurial actors
The “prima donna” of EE is the entrepreneur. A person with enough energy and the 
capacity to imagine and plan things in the future from an independent and leading 
perspective. Some exceptionally successful entrepreneurs will continue to operate in 
ecosystems – serial entrepreneurs, angel investors, advisors, or dealmakers. (Spigel 
& Harrison, 2018).
Although we admit that successful entrepreneurship will ultimately be a collec-
tive affair – an explicit system – as we argue in this study, it is technically correct 
and necessary to properly understand the key role played by entrepreneurs within the 
regional or global economy – they are the “seeds” of the EE. Even if entrepreneurs 
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choose to exit the market, most of them will remain in the EE. And the system will 
benefit from the human resource they nurtured and educated.
The very successful, fast-growing start-ups play one positive role. Of course, there 
aren’t many, but they play a major role as models, with fascinating spill-over effects 
(Brown & Mason, 2017). “The creation of a country’s wealth and dynamism depends 
upon the competitiveness of its firms and this, in turn, relies fundamentally on the 
capabilities of its entrepreneurs” (Cuervo et al., 2007: 7). Therefore, we consider the 
entrepreneurs a main pillar of the EE and will include it in assessing an EE index.
Entrepreneurial connectors
This structure based on relations facilitates how resources move in an ecosys-
tem so that entrepreneurs can access them (Spigel & Harrison, 2018). The more 
entrepreneurs share information and meet, the more they will fulfill the vari-
ous necessities of the EE panel of clients to the benefit of all. By observing and 
interacting with others, entrepreneurs also learn new skills, learn how to acquire 
potential customers and learn how to secure external funding and other resources 
(Nicotra et al., 2017).
According to Audretsch et al. (2018), ecosystems are inherently based on cooper-
ation and less competition and profit maximization. This is an important statement, 
which brings both unproductive and productive entrepreneurs to the literature. As 
Audretsch et al. (2018) fairly mention, profit maximization may not be EE’s ambi-
tion, but job creation, reduction of poverty, satisfying everyday needs in resources, 
and sustainability.
Finally, entrepreneurs’ resources are often tied to social networks, and hence trust 
is critical (Spigel & Harrison, 2018). Social capital and networks effectively act as 
the arteries circulating the lifeblood of information, ideas, and tacit knowledge ena-
bling ecosystems to function properly (Spigel, 2017).
Entrepreneurial resources providers
Resource providers are key actors in an EE. When one speaks about resources, 
it is primarily about financial resources and skills (Belitski et  al., 2019). Busi-
ness angels and venture capitalists not only provide financial capital but knowl-
edge capital (Nicotra et al., 2017), or “knowledge emanating from entrepreneurial 
firms and incumbents can become a source of knowledge spill-over within each 
specific context of organization, alliance, industry or region” (Audretsch et  al., 
2020: 9).
Institutions do not make part of entrepreneurial resources in the ecosystem but 
can moderate the access to resources and make the region attractive for external 
funds. Institutions represent the rules and culture of a region (North, 1990) that can 
be conducive for other resources and support structures to emerge, helping entrepre-
neurs of all types: physical space, capital, coaching, common services, and network-
ing connections (Nicotra et al., 2017).
Knowledge capital is an important resource for entrepreneurs to grow businesses 
and compete nationally, regionally, and internationally (Neck et al., 2004).
 International Entrepreneurship and Management Journal
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Entrepreneurial culture
It is not easy to change entrepreneurship culture overnight (Levie & Autio, 2008; 
Estrin et  al., 2013). For example, policy-makers that used to work in different 
institutional contexts (Aidis et  al., 2012), for example, during communist times 
and in a market economy, may inherit informal institutions from the past (Webb 
et  al., 2019) and continue practicing an informal culture of the previous insti-
tutional context. This may significantly affect both policy-makers and entrepre-
neurs’ objective or decision-making, often making them rent-seeking rather than 
growth-oriented (Méon & Sekkat, 2005). In the short term, informal, often cor-
rupt practices could have the effect of acting either as a “grease” for the wheels 
for entrepreneurs (see Belitski et al., 2016; Dreher & Gassebner, 2013; Shleifer 
& Vishny, 2002), but in the long term, it may destroy or impede the growth of the 
entire EE.
These corrupt practices, which have persisted since the previous regimes 
in many European countries, still are very much in use by the current policy-
makers which deeply fraction society, and corrupt media and web, as well as 
the legal system, make unproductive entrepreneurship activity a new formal law 
(Webb et al., 2019).
While institutional transformations formally have brought changes to coun-
tries, informal mechanisms persist and continue to influence how entrepreneur-
ship is perceived and practiced (Fritsch et al., 2019).
Introducing political entrepreneurship to entrepreneurial ecosystem
In the Journal of Political Economic article, titled “Entrepreneurship: Productive, 
Unproductive and Destructive,” William Baumol (1990) proposed a theory of entre-
preneurship allocation. Desai and Acs (2007) use it to explain why entrepreneurship 
may not always be associated with higher incomes, innovation, economic growth, 
and entrepreneurship activity that may not be engaged in activity aimed at increas-
ing wealth, power and prestige (Baumol, 1990). This study proposes the theory of 
destructive entrepreneurship, which later has gained significant popularity (Weitzel 
et al., 2010; Desai et al., 2013; Acs et al., 2013; Collins et al., 2016). These stud-
ies emphasize that entrepreneurship is not an inherently economically healthy activ-
ity and can be allocated among productive, unproductive, and destructive forms. 
When unproductive and destructive entrepreneurship comes in collaboration with 
corrupt authorities, political entrepreneurship emerges. Corrupt policymakers may 
directly or indirectly own or benefit from unproductive entrepreneurship. Corrup-
tion can both grease and sand the wheels of business, but in the case of political 
entrepreneurship, it will only support entrepreneurial activity based on rent-seeking, 
co-ownership, and bribes (Dreher & Gassebner, 2013; Sauka & Welter, 2007; Méon 
& Sekkat, 2005).
For entrepreneurial activity in his work Baumol (1990) identifies a crucial 
role for public policy and government’s role in creating conducive conditions 
for entrepreneurs. He notes that “the prevailing rules that affect the allocation of 
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entrepreneurial activity can be observed, described, and, with luck, modified and 
improved…” (Baumol, 1990: 894).
While the benevolent government would aim to ultimately increase economic 
development through changes in institutions to promote entrepreneurial activity, 
in the corrupt government, the goal is rent-seeking and profit maximization for 
both entrepreneurs and policymakers (Chowdhury et al., 2015). This behavior may 
increase entrepreneurs’ economic wealth but reduce the wealth of the whole society 
– destructive entrepreneurship.
Simply put, researchers may want to understand and model the “rules of the 
game” where entrepreneurs and government are intimately working together for 
rent-seeking and demonstrate the outcome of such behavior for a region. Corrupt 
government is defined as one that uses the public office for personal benefit (Treis-
man, 2000) and can manifest itself differently.
Small bribes, which can often be called “attentions,” are given to authori-
ties, individuals in power, public leaders, the medical system and even non-
for-profit organizations, police, and teachers. This becomes an informal com-
mon law (Aidis et  al., 2012). Once corruption becomes deeply embedded in 
culture, with historical roots, entrepreneurs adjust to the culture and outreach 
authorities to reduce the effect of burdensome regulation, taxes, and permits 
(Belitski et al., 2016).
When we talk about political entrepreneurship, it may occur on different scales. 
From a bribe to speed up the procedures to open a business to governmental con-
tracts, access to resources and construction sites, real estate investments, securing 
import and export permits, avoiding taxes, and others.
Destructive entrepreneurs may get access to exclusive permits and licenses 
to use energy, export raw materials, monopoly on import and distribution 
of rare drugs to the healthcare system. Destructive and unproductive entre-
preneurs “backed” by powerful authorities who share business benefits by 
providing preferences in access to EE resources are referred to as political 
entrepreneurs.
Political entrepreneurship is a phenomenon of developing and transition countries 
with weak institutions (North, 1990), the rule of law (Estrin et al., 2013) where the 
marriage of rent-seeking policymakers and unproductive and destructive entrepre-
neurs is possible. With an economy with burdensome regulation (Audretsch et al., 
2019b), it may become very hard to impossible to do business profitably without 
paying informal payments to authorities, avoid high fines and taxes, with the sys-
tem itself creates conditions to promote such entrepreneurial activity. In an economy 
where the law changes regularly, the fiscal agents have extended powers over entre-
preneurs, and the judicial system is slow and corrupt; political entrepreneurship can 
become an effective problem-solving tool “greasing the wheels” of entrepreneurs 
(Belitski et al., 2016).
The Economist observed that “some people have done much better than oth-
ers, and not all of them by fair means. Communist officials and securocrats who 
rebranded themselves as democrats had the education and connections to retain 
power, make money and profit from an insider – dominated privatizations” 
(The Economist, 2019: 29). Former apparatchiks who rebranded themselves as 
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entrepreneurs and have maintained their strong links with authorities, have cre-
ated a class of “political entrepreneurs” in many East European countries. More 
specifically they “coercively obtained resources from the state toward processes 
of production which would not otherwise have taken place” (McCaffrey & 
Salerno, 2011: 556) disturbing and exploiting the ecosystem, limiting resources 
by administrative means for other entrepreneurs. In some instances, political 
entrepreneurs could use government “intelligence” as an “insurance” for foreign 
direct investors when investing in their business. This was not possible with other 
entrepreneurs who had no access to “intelligence insurance” and could not pro-
vide as strong insurance to investors in a fragile environment. The way political 
entrepreneurs become moderators for EE resources to entrepreneurial outcomes 
of ecosystem, culture and public policy is described in the conceptual framework 
(Fig. 1).
Figure 1 shows how EE’s main pillars (Brown & Mason, 2017; Stam, 2018) can 
be transferred into entrepreneurial outcomes and outputs for the region.
We suggest a limited set of factors or elements that affect the prevalence of entre-
preneurship in a region. We integrate the insights from the empirical literature on 
entrepreneurship and institutional economics’s geography into Fig. 1, reflecting an 
entrepreneurial ecosystem framework with four major pillars that are further facili-
tated by entrepreneurial actors and policy (institutions) (North, 1990). Altogether 
institutions and entrepreneurial actors (Autio et al., 2014; Audretsch et al., 2019b) 
face political entrepreneurship, which performs as a filter for entrepreneurial actors. 
In weak institutions, entrepreneurial actors become unproductive and destructive 
entrepreneurs once faced with policymakers who become active entrepreneurial 
actors themselves (Desai et  al., 2013; Acs et  al., 2013; Collins et  al., 2016) (see 
Fig. 1). This framework with initial four elements provides a compromise between 
other frameworks with five to fourteen elements (Vedula & Kim, 2019; Isenberg 
& Onyemah, 2016; Acs et al., 2014) in the process of value creation and securing 
competitive advantage. We build on these frameworks and develop them further by 
Fig. 1  A conceptual model of political entrepreneurship embedded in entrepreneurial ecosystem
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separating inputs and outputs of the system, providing an academically grounded set 
of elements, and using empirical indicators more closely reflecting political entre-
preneurship as an essential component of EE in countries with weak institutions and 
the rule of law. This framework contrasts with the Stam (2018) framework for a 
developed country where formal institutions are strong and the rule of law can be 
enforced.
Drawing on Desai and Acs (2007) and Desai et al. (2013), we develop three fun-
damental assumptions how political entrepreneurship can intervene and affect EE: 
(1) rent-capturing behavior of entrepreneurs and authorities, (2) constant supply of 
entrepreneurs and their allocation into productive and unproductive ways (3) weak 
political institutions and high corruption. We hypothesize:
Hypothesis: Political entrepreneurship will moderate stakeholders’ perception 
about the quality of the entrepreneurial ecosystem.
The context of the transition economy
The World Economic Forum’s (WEF) global competitiveness index, defined as the set 
of institutions, policies, and factors that determine a country’s level of productivity, 
can be considered as an appropriate summary indicator of an entrepreneurial ecosys-
tem. (Kshetri, 2014) The focus of this study is on Romanian city-regions. The World 
Economic Forum (2019) has ranked Romania as the 51st most competitive country in 
the world. Countries such as Bulgaria (49th), Hungary (47th), Slovakia (42nd), Poland 
(37th), and the Czech Republic (32nd) are better ranked than Romania.
According to the World Bank Doing Business Index (2020), Romania ranks in 
55th place worldwide, among the last in the EU.
Corruption is a concept often related to Romania. (Iamandi & Voicu-Dorobantu, 
2007). “Corruption is one of the most vexing problems confronting us today, as it 
inflicts many different layers of economies by distorting incentives and weakening 
institutions.” (Amin & Soh, 2019, p.2). Romania scored 44 points out of 100 on the 
2020 Corruption Perceptions Index reported by Transparency International, again 
among the last in the EU.
The ranking of Romania – according to these criteria – at the bottom of the EU 
countries is a complete paradox. The country has enormous potential: it is the 6th coun-
try in EU regarding population and the 8th regarding territory (Eurostat, 2020), a com-
plex of natural resources, the second position in EU when we speak about fertile soil 
areas, perfect climate, high quality of water, excellent crossroads position; it had quali-
fied workforce too (most of it, unfortunately, producing added value for other coun-
tries- according to National Statistics Institute (2020) only in 2019, 239,000 Romanians 
citizens left the country for a period longer than 12 months, following a 13 year trend). 
What complex factors led to this critical situation? The answer to this question should 
– and must be a serious challenge to the researcher. A mentality that tolerates systemic 
corruption – a “Balkanic” mentality, how it is often named - a culture that weakens the 
institutions and ultimately generates the “political entrepreneurship.”
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In the few years after the totalitarian regimes fell in 1990, “apparatchiks” grabbed 
the most appealing state actives and had access to important financial resources. From 
this “pole position” primarily acquired, they maintained until today some major profit 
mechanisms, with political leverage upon institutions and public money, through the 
corruption of various types and pressure at central and local levels.
While Romania entered European Union in 2007 and was forced to significantly 
improve its institutional quality, informal institutions such as political entrepreneur-
ship have been preserved. Studies for Romania claim that the quality of institutions is 
the largest impediment for the prosperity and growth of the country, directly affecting 
the performance and sustainability of entrepreneurs. Furthermore, in Romania, the EE 
includes two types of institutions, also known as “two worlds”: one protected, fostered 
by formal institutions, and one exposed, “free to fight” for survival (Ciucan-Rusu & 
Szabo, 2013). Sometimes these political entrepreneurs have no employees, no equip-
ment, no industrial facilities, more than often a postcode in some “tax heaven”, which is 
used to exploit local resources in the form of political and destructive entrepreneurship.
The origin of political entrepreneurship is inside the political ecosystem – that was 
primarily the centralized economy, conducted with iron hands by political apparatus, 
based on ideological principles with random and weak connections with the objective, 
statistic laws of economy. A costly experiment in history, but it did exist long enough to 
induce severe and persistent slippage in mentalities and morale.
To reverse that to natural evolution mechanisms – it is a slow and painful process 
(the costs are high), but it is yet the best way to progress for humankind.
Data and method
Interviews and survey description
To test our conceptual framework, we perform 18 in depth interviews and developed 
and collected primary data using the online survey of stakeholders (Brown & Mason, 
2017; Godley et al., 2019) in Romania, South-East Europe.
Face-to-face interviews covered all categories of EE stakeholders from the two 
places (ten from Bucharest and eight from Cluj-Napoca). The interviews provided use-
ful data and nuances complementary to the survey. The profile of the interviewees is 
presented in the following Table 7 in Appendix.
The questionnaire we sent included 28 questions aiming to capture the vari-
ety of EE factors in two major Romanian cities – Bucharest and Cluj-Napoca and 
241 responses received with finally 218 used. Please find Table 1 descriptive sta-
tistics for the variables. The answers were collected through Google forms during 
June–September 2019.
Identifying entrepreneurial ecosystem elements
Regarding the structure of the survey responses, 63.3% are male, and 36.7% are 
female. A proportion of 53.2% of the respondents are from Bucharest, and the rest 
1 3
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are from Cluj-Napoca, 97.2% of them having completed higher education. Entrepre-
neurs constitute 45.4% of the sample, while 14.7% were less than 29 years old and 
8.6% were older than 60.
Our empirical analysis includes several stages.
We start by drawing on Brown and Mason (2017) to combine the charac-
teristics of the ecosystem into four major blocks – indices as an average of the 
specific components in Table  1, assigning to each variable an equal weight. 
We had no reason to consider that some characteristics of the ecosystem may 
contribute differently to ecosystem indices following Stam (2015). We created 
the Entrepreneurial actor’s index (EA) using two variables of Entrepreneurship 
actors and stakeholders connectivity. We constructed the Entrepreneurial con-
nectors index (ECN) using the variables of formal networks, informal networks, 
and university support. We constructed the Entrepreneurial resource providers 
index (ERP) by using the Venture and debt capital, government support. We 
created the Entrepreneurial culture index (EC) by using the variables of entre-
preneurial culture, awareness of entrepreneurship, and Media support. Finally, 
we also created the Corruption and political entrepreneurship index (CPE) 
using variables of corruption perception and political entrepreneurship.
Table  2 provides information regarding the reliability of our measurement for 
each crated index as well as descriptive statistics. All Cronbach’s Alpha values are 
above the minimum threshold of 0.7, and the composite reliability values have high 
values in each case.
We then created a quality of ecosystem index (EE) as an average of four indices. 
This allowed us to increase the variation in the index as well as to include all four 
elements suggested by Brown and Mason (2017) in one model. The distribution of 
each index across two regions is in Fig. 2.
Once we developed our indices, the second stage of our empirical analysis dem-
onstrates the differences in perceptions of ecosystem quality and corruption across 
different respondents. We performed the t-tests to examine the difference in means 
across three categories the perception about the ecosystem quality and each of its 
components (1) whether the respondent is an entrepreneur; (2) whether the respond-
ent is from Bucharest or Cluj-Napoca; and (3) whether the entrepreneur is a woman. 
Table 3 presents the results of the t-test. There are no significant differences between 
Table 2  Descriptive statistics for latent variables and reliability of indices
Online survey in Romania on entrepreneurial ecosystem
Index Mean SD Median Min Max Cronbach’s Alpha Composite 
reliability 
Index
EA 4.310 1.272 4.333 1 7 0.790 0.724
ECN 3.856 1.205 4.000 1 7 0.860 0.836
ERP 4.124 1.223 4.333 1 7 0.770 0.730
EC 4.653 1.300 5.000 1 7 0.851 0.828
EE 4.236 1.127 4.312 1 7 – –
CPE 4.292 1.766 4.050 1 7 – –
1 3
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Fig. 2  The distribution of the indices used in the model
Table 3  Difference in means of perception about EE quality and its elements between entrepreneurs and 
other stakeholders
Online survey in Romania on entrepreneurial ecosystem
Occupation Average value P – value Decision
Entrepreneur Other- 
stakeholders
Entrepreneurial actors index (EA) 4.037 4.538 0.003 Reject the null
Entrepreneurial connectors index 
(ECN)
3.722 3.966 0.136 Fail to reject the null
Entrepreneurial resource providers 
index (ERP)
3.852 4.350 0.002 Reject the null
Entrepreneurial culture index (EC) 4.531 4.754 0.211 Fail to reject the null
Corruption and political entrepre-
neurship index (CPE)
4.298 4.382 0.065 Fail to reject the null
Entrepreneurial ecosystem quality 
index (EE)
4.036 4.402 0.017 Reject the null
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stakeholders’ perception of each component of the ecosystem by and other EE stake-
holders on the quality of entrepreneurial connectors, entrepreneurial culture, and 
political entrepreneurship – our main variables of interest.
A similar approach explores differences between main EE quality index and other 
elements between two cities in Romania - Bucharest and Cluj-Napoca (Table  4). 
Significant differences were found between the two cities in respondents’ percep-
tion about political entrepreneurship and entrepreneurial culture. Political entrepre-
neurship was significantly higher in Bucharest – the capital where policymakers are 
located and can have greater impact on EE.
Likewise, we test potential differences in perception EE quality and its elements 
between male and female respondents (Table 5). Interestingly that only dimension 
where the perception does not differ significantly is the perception of corruption and 
political entrepreneurship. Rest of dimensions the perceptions about EE was signifi-
cantly different. This is an important finding demonstrates that there is a unity in a 
society about the degree of political entrepreneurship.
Simulation analysis and measuring entrepreneurial ecosystem
The third stage of our empirical analysis includes the creation of a dependent vari-
able which will later be used in the estimation, that we call the overall ecosystem 
index. The overall index adjusts to the perception of respondents in regard to the 
quality of the ecosystem conditional on the perceived level of political entrepreneur-
ship in the ecosystem. Building on Stam (2018) prior research, we construct the 
overall ecosystem index by measuring the difference between the perceived qual-
ity of the ecosystem (EE) and the penalty component in the function, which is the 
extent of political entrepreneurship and corruption in a system.
This equation proposes that the overall ecosystem index is the difference between 
the perceived quality of the ecosystem (EE index) and the perceived level of cor-
ruption and political entrepreneurship (CPE) by region. To calculate the index, we 
perform a simulation in which various proportions of CPE are considered in shaping 
the respondents’ overall perception of the ecosystem. Instead of simply subtracting 
CPE by each respondent, we perform a simulation exercise by generating 100 over-
all ecosystem indices with each of it varies with the proportion of the perceived 
corruption and political entrepreneurship. More specifically, the simulation of the 
overall ecosystem index is explained in the equation below:
where i- is a share of perceptions from 1 to 100% that accounts for different weights 
of political entrepreneurship shaping the respondents’ perception of the entrepre-
neurial ecosystem environment.
The fourth stage in our analysis is to explore how the perception of entrepre-
neurial ecosystem quality, proxied by the overall ecosystem index, depends on the 
(1)Overall ecosystem index = EE–CPE
(2)   = –(∕) ∗ ,  = , ..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respondents’ perception of political entrepreneurship and corruption in the ecosys-
tem and whether the relationship varies by our main explanatory variables, which 
may define the perception of EE quality - gender, occupation category (entre-
preneur vs. other), the sustainable orientation of business, region and productive 
entrepreneurship. Having simulated 100 models, we produced the histograms 
(Appendix Fig.  5) and plotted them (Fig.  3). The results demonstrate the coef-
ficient’s size in the relationship between political entrepreneurship and the overall 
ecosystem quality by five respondents’ characteristics (see Fig. 3). We also illus-
trate the relationship between ecosystem quality and the perception of the extent 
of political entrepreneurship across different respondent’s characteristics in Fig. 4.
One can notice that the main differences in the ecosystem quality conditional on 
the perceptions of political entrepreneurship vary by region but they change signifi-
cantly more compared to the rest of the factors.
Model
To test our hypotheses, we use ordinary least square (OLS) estimation. We follow 
Baltagi (2008) who considered the regression model to capture the effects within 
the cross-sectional data given. The cross-sectional OLS regression does not allow 
Table 5  Difference in means of perception about EE quality and its elements by gender of respondent
Source: Online survey in Romania on entrepreneurial ecosystem
Gender Average value P – value Decision
Male Female
Entrepreneurial actors index (EA) 4.174 4.546 0.03 Reject the null
Entrepreneurial connectors index (ECN) 3.723 4.084 0.027 Reject the null
Entrepreneurial resource providers index (ERP) 3.993 4.350 0.033 Reject the null
Entrepreneurial culture index (EC) 4.519 4.883 0.037 Reject the null
Corruption and political entrepreneurship index 
(CPE)
4.391 4.263 0.526 Fail to reject the null
Entrepreneurial ecosystem quality index (EE) 4.102 4.466 0.017 Reject the null
Fig. 3  The relationship between 
the perception of ecosystem 
quality and the degree of 
political entrepreneurship by 
five respondents characteristics 
using 100 Monte-Carlo simula-
tions
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for unobserved heterogeneity across cities and time and has its drawbacks related 
to inferences and establishing the causal relationship. The following model was 
estimated:
where  yi is an overall ecosystem index calculated in eq. (2) following drawing on the 
theoretical approach of Stam (2015), with adjustment for political entrepreneurship 
in each city i in 2018–2019. β and Ɵ are parameters to be estimated,  xit is a vector 
of independent explanatory variables related to testing our hypothesis such as are 
respondents’ perception regarding the entrepreneurial ecosystem quality proxied by 
productive entrepreneurship, gender, occupation, region and whether the respond-
ents perceive businesses as sustainable. at time t by city i.
Results
Quantitative results of the survey
Table 6 below presents the results of a regression analysis (3). Columns 1 and 2 
present illustrate the productive entrepreneurship activity (EEP) effect. As one 
would expect, an increase in productive entrepreneurship increases the overall qual-
ity of the ecosystem, and this demonstrates that the index was calculated correctly. 
The coefficient of productive entrepreneurship activity (EEP) is positive and signif-
icant, confirming that direct effect on entrepreneurial ecosystems. The goodness of 





i = 1,… , N;
Fig. 4  changes in the relationship between the overall ecosystem index and explanatory variables at dif-
ferent level of CPE (p – values are reported). Note: solid line for 0.05 is equal to the significance rate of 
p = 0.05%. own calculation.
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in the overall ecosystem index could be explained with the variables in the model. 
In the second specification, once we take out control for productive entrepreneur-
ship activity in the ecosystem and leave the rest of the explanatory variables, the 
explanatory power of the model decreases to 18.4%. Based on this sensitivity anal-
ysis, we conclude that productive entrepreneurship (EEP) in the ecosystem has a 
significant contribution, up to 38% of the variation of the perceived entrepreneurial 
ecosystem quality.
Finally, Fig. 4 presents the p – values attached to each explanatory variable when 
estimating the regression model (3) and dependent on the proportion accounted for 
CPE. The results demonstrate that productive entrepreneurship in the ecosystem 
(EEP) is positively associated with the overall quality of EE (β = 0.526, p < 0.05) 
at every level of political entrepreneurship. Regional effects become stronger once 
the perceived level of entrepreneurship is greater than 25%. The gender effects 
Table 6  OLS regression results. 
DV: Overall ecosystem index
p – values are in parentheses; *** – p value <0.001; ** – p value 
<0.01 * – p value <0.05
Source: own calculation































































R2/Adjusted R2 46.58% / 45.32% 18.4% / 6.68%
Number of observations 218 218
RMSE 2.63 3.05
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become insignificant with an increase in political entrepreneurship. While we find 
that changes in the perception of political entrepreneurship (CPE) in a city moder-
ate other ecosystem characteristics such as gender and region in their relationship 
to productive entrepreneurship, it does not change the extent that EEP affects the 
overall ecosystem quality. Our main variable of interest the EEP remains significant 
at any level of political entrepreneurship and corruption index (CPE).
Our results demonstrate that CPE is institutionalized in both regions (Cuervo-
Cazurra, 2006) as changes in CPE do not affect the extent to which EEP can change 
the overall ecosystem index. This is harmful to ecosystem quality as the main deter-
minant of it – EEP does not contribute to ecosystem quality as corruption level may 
change. When the proportion of corruption and political entrepreneurship increases, 
the difference between non–entrepreneurs and entrepreneurs’ perception of the eco-
system increases. The opposite tendency applies to region. When CPE increases the 
respondents from Cluj-Napoca tend to perceive a better EE than the respondents 
from Bucharest.
Interview results
Our interviewees shared that they are they often feel poorly rewarded for their entre-
preneurial effort in Romanian EE. This is associated with several factors: high doing 
business risks, uncertain future, so an entrepreneur is reluctant to open business and 
talk to community about it. I6 comments
“There were many projects with EU money destined to educate entrepreneur-
ial spirit and to create an entrepreneurial culture. In the last years, the pop-
ulation began to understand the important role of entrepreneurs for society. 
Tolerance of failure is still a problem in Romania. It is still a "disaster" if you 
fail…” (Interviewee 6)
A sensible difference in perception between the entrepreneurs and the rest of stake-
holders should be noted, when we consider availability of resources to entrepreneurs.
I1 explains “Local and national government unfortunately doesn’t help enough; 
there are some governmental programmes, but the bureaucracy is huge and usu-
ally money comes late, and so there are hidden costs that perturbed the initial 
business plans. There are incubators, some of them are functioning well, part of 
them were created because it was a ‘must’.
I12 focuses on specific resource providers: “Apart the main money providers 
which are the banks, some others: e.g. business angels and venture capital are 
new comers on the scene, but they are not yet at a critical mass.”
A better perception of EE in Cluj-Napoca than in Bucharest seems surprising, 
Cluj is a newcomer in comparison with Bucharest. But concerning traditions, edu-
cation, working attitude, that’s another story. Cluj region have been 700  years in 
close contact with the German culture regarding production and people: discipline 
and rigour oriented, but liberal. The individual should look diligently for his own 
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prosperity and his family, for which he is the most responsible. This particular type 
of culture believes in community and in things well done. There are notable differ-
ences in the perception of the corruption levels. There is the following explanation 
which comes to mind. We observe at Cluj a better perception regarding the EE. We 
believe at this point that the respondents are subconsciously influenced by trends 
and the growth gradient of the local economy and the persistence of entrepreneurs 
(Fritsch et al., 2019). Cluj is a relatively newcomer at the top, but the last years were 
impressive: to mention only the real-estate parameters, who would think that Cluj 
will reach the Bucharest quotations for the built square meter? The differences con-
cerning the resources providers – not so important this time, could be explained geo-
graphically. Many resources are coming from the European Union, and Cluj-Napoca 
is better placed.
And, significantly in our opinion, the local administrative leaders, properly 
understanding the environment, gradually exceeded the miserable political swamps, 
bureaucratic and greedy, to a more human and growth-oriented attitude; they are 
now an established brand in the country. These stakeholders explain.
I13 states that “Public administration in Cluj-Napoca is welcoming and encour-
aging initiatives; and the regulatory environment is good, much better than else-
where in Romania, especially in last 3–5 years under the new mayor, when politi-
cal entrepreneurship starts disappearing in a city.
I14 further adds “Local government understands that success and well-being 
of community are not dependent on local government alone, but also external 
finance and free competition without corrupt ties would be a facilitator of the 
ecosystem.
I18 was harsh about the phenomenon in the country: “Late totalitarian system is 
to blame - parasites before, parasites now, and they move from one generation 
to the next in the same logic. This troubles me…. They “poison” business envi-
ronment limiting natural growth for other more competitive entrepreneurs and 
making privileged share the “pie”. But even worse, their presence is generating 
corruption in the whole system – because corruption is like a virus: it exists 
latent in nature (in this case “human nature”) and when it meets favourable 
conditions it infects the body in no time, crippling badly an otherwise healthy 
and promising EE”. I18 continues “There are some notable exceptions in the 
northern territories of the continent, who have succeeded to build an efficient 
immune system”.
Finally, I16 posits: “In terms of the policy environment, from my observation the 
mayor is open. He is open to dialogue, open to listening. He says he hates politi-
cal entrepreneurship – people believe him. You could say that he has time on his 
side: Cluj is booming. The infrastructure is being improved rapidly and while 
corrupt practices still persist, new market opportunities take over”.
The differences in attitudes towards sustainability of EE between the two 
regions are understandable. The industries in Cluj-Napoca are relatively new and 
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technologically more sophisticated. They attracted a young and educated labour 
force, with a different mentality and perception of the environment and nature. Plus, 
as two different participants noted:
I17 comments “There are business angel financing only eco-friendly business, 
and something more substantial companies would need to liaise with authori-
ties”. This demonstrates that political entrepreneurship becomes an issue, once 
the returns to the project or the scope and size of the business project increases.
I9 further adds “We have start-ups, developed start-ups, mature companies that 
want to get involved in community projects, but we need “ok” by authorities. 
These are unlikely to give us a green light unless they directly or indirectly benefit 
from the project”.
I2 further comments “This was not the case a few years ago in our city. You 
would need to know someone from city administration to participate in a com-
petition or win a grant. Moreover these policy-makers had their own companies. 
Public administration is now also active on international platforms, events, but 
not without the self-benefit.
I15 also posits that “One of our biggest challenges to understand the degree of 
political entrepreneurship is the absence of data. Things are moving fast and 
hence it is hard to keep up. We encourage the philosophy of ‘make meaning, not 
money”.
I18 also mentions some traits of a political entrepreneur: “About the typical 
actor of a post-communist country – the political entrepreneur – they envis-
age and envelop business opportunities with considerable added – value, even 
temporary; or to benefit from a temporary monopoly situation. They have usu-
ally a cynical attitude towards business: they do not “attach” themselves to a 
particular field –their dream is to accumulate, no matter how, fundamentally he 
is a “fake”.
First, we noticed through the subjects` answers a common opinion that Romania 
is still in a transition paradigm, oriented to a better understanding and a proper cul-
ture on entrepreneurship by the society as a whole, but still marked by sequels of 
ideological origin, like the embedded fear and shame of failure.
Second, some interviewees observed the excessive bureaucracy and the perpetual 
habit of avoiding taking responsibility. The subjects also underline the scarcity of 
financial resources providers and the high costs of money.
Third, the perceived differences between the two regions are substantial. The 
respondents attributed the spectacular evolution of the Cluj EE to the town’s 
quality of local administration. Interestingly, that regional cities such as Cluj 
are less corrupt. However, we started to understand that communities are pro-
tective in small cities and can “cover-up” political entrepreneurship, while in 
Bucharest -large city communities are diverse and corruption becomes more 
visible.
Fourth, our interview findings also call for more analysis on gender perspective.
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The literature is practically unanimous in presenting statistics that show that 
women face more constraints than a business man (Fairlie & Robb, 2009), having 
lower access to resources and institutional support (Coleman, 2002; Van der Zwan 
et al., 2012). In the entrepreneurial process, there is a difference between intentions 
and action (Gieure et al., 2020).
In summary, the respondents appreciate rather positively the evolution trends of 
the systems towards mature and productive EE’s, open to a European free-market 
mentality. However, the progress is (too) slow, nonlinear, with setbacks, still seri-
ously threatened by corruption, lack of competence and the lethal interference of the 
political factor.
Discussion and conclusions
Our study of political entrepreneurship’s value-added is that it provides a framework 
– a missing link between institutions and entrepreneurship literature explaining the 
destructive nature of political entrepreneurship with its gender and regional aspects. 
Of course, political entrepreneurs are an economic reality of developing and transi-
tion economies where formal institutions and culture of corruption and communi-
ties are deeply embedded into developmental policies and laws. We demonstrated 
that political entrepreneurship and corruption had been institutionalized (Cuervo-
Cazurra, 2006).
While the objective of EEs in developed economies (Stam, 2015, 2018; Stam 
& Van de Ven, 2020) is productive and growth-oriented entrepreneurship activ-
ity, regional economic development (Audretsch & Belitski, 2021), this study 
argues that these objectives cannot be taken for granted in developing and tran-
sition countries. For these countries, the gap between productive and unproduc-
tive entrepreneurship (Desai & Acs, 2007) in the regional entrepreneurial eco-
systems is still large. This gap is mainly caused by the market uncertainty and 
the perception of political entrepreneurship and corruption that sands the wheels 
of business in transition economies. Productive and growth-oriented entrepre-
neurs who cannot secure authorities’ support or have no funds to pay bribes and 
penetrate the political entrepreneurship filter may not continue with the early-
stage activity and will be forced into the semi-formal economy or market exit. 
There also remains a significant number of business registrations registered as 
“one-day firms” to participate in corrupt practices and money laundering (Belit-
ski et al., 2016).
The important policy implications for transition countries are developed.
First, acknowledging the problem at the regional and national and European lev-
els that “political” entrepreneurship is a hidden form of destructive entrepreneur-
ship (Baumol, 1990) with strong privileged access to resources and markets in 
the region benefits rent-seeking authorities. It is important to uncover the ultimate 
goal of “political” entrepreneurship, which is less likely long-term growth-oriented 
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business, as time in the office is limited and the rent-seeking opportunities are lim-
ited as well.
Second, institutional trust and transparency in transition economies, particularly 
to court systems to uncover and make unproductive activities by political entrepre-
neurs more visible and put a peer-pressure by electorate and communities. While 
rent-seeking behavior only aims at profit maximization for a limited number of 
entrepreneurial actors and connectors (Brown & Mason, 2017), this form of entre-
preneurship distorts markets.
Third, while political entrepreneurs’ objective is to reallocate resources and 
prevent market entry by other early-stage entrepreneurs in the ecosystem, lower 
regulatory burden and transparency of grant applications and public procurement 
is a must.
Fourth, we ask: “How sustainable is political entrepreneurship” to transition 
economy? The answer it is not, as it impedes economic development and free-mar-
ket competition making customers pay more for the products and services. Control 
over public procurement, publishing contracts, and grants in the open press and plat-
forms could become the first step to providing equal access to information for entre-
preneurs connected to authorities and other EE stakeholders, including independent 
media.
Fifth, long-term political entrepreneurship is not sustainable and can be lim-
ited to the term in office with international pressure and market competition 
needed to be increased. It is easier for countries within the European Union to 
achieve through the existing mechanisms of audit and standards of data dis-
closure enforced by the European Commission. For non-EU countries, such as 
Serbia, Montenegro, Albania, Ukraine, any international pressure, including by 
the European Commission, is limited. This may be conducive to further persis-
tence of political entrepreneurship in the region. Improving the quality of insti-
tutions and law enforcement (Fritsch et al., 2019) may be important to minimize 
political entrepreneurship’s negative effect on productive entrepreneurship in the 
ecosystem.
The policy can change overnight, while informal institutions that support 
political entrepreneurship may not. This is important to understand for entrepre-
neurs who plan to start a business in developing and transition economies. Creat-
ing social ties (Bordeaux and Nikolaev, 2019) may be necessary for market entry 
and competition in economies with weak institutions. The culture of a region has 
changed since many countries joined the European Union and became more open 
to international entrepreneurship, which pushes for higher quality, disclosure, and 
law rule.
Lastly, government policies are important to pursue productive goals of ecosys-
tems (Stam, 2018) and understanding the mechanisms we uncovered in this study, 
such as stakeholder type, productive entrepreneurship, the role of regional location, 
and governance that can become a role model for other regions to fight political 
entrepreneurship. The example of Cluj city-region is appealing. Local and national 
governments would need to adopt a place-based approach when fighting political 
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entrepreneurship. This study further calls for action by local policymakers and entre-
preneurial actors to collaborate on transparency to increase institutional trust that 
may impede EE quality.
Implications for the foreign investors include a need to be aware that success in 
the market may be related to the strength of the relationship with authorities, but for-
mal institutions can be used more effectively to enforce the rule of law, particularly 
in countries within the European Union.
The situation may be very particular in countries where post-communist 
“nomenklatura” still persists and is not aligned with entrepreneurial activity, 
such countries in Eastern and southeast Europe. In these countries of Europe, 
bureaucrats have maintained the informal institutions’ system and social ties 
and implement it for an ecosystem for rent-seeking. Further research should 
contribute to the time scale of the phenomenon and whether this problem is a 
short or long-term issue, again more longitudinal data before joining the EU 
and after is important to further unpack it. Further data may also be used to 
calculate the costs and benefits of political entrepreneurship in developing and 
transition economies, to understand the damage corruption and political entre-
preneurs puts on EE.
Limitations and further research
Although this study has several significant limitations, such as cross-sectional 
data and a limited number of experts and interviewees, it allowed for mixed 
methods to be used to demonstrate how determinants of EE can lead to com-
petitive advantage and higher EE quality. Further studies with longitudinal 
data on changes in attitudes towards political entrepreneurship and EE’s qual-
ity should follow. That would allow us to test our conceptual framework of 
political entrepreneurship as one of EE’s outcomes and a moderator of EE 
inputs and outputs.
Further research effort needs to engage with the mechanisms and best practices 
on dealing with political entrepreneurship most effectively. Further research on 
entrepreneurial actors is needed who are corrupt to demonstrate its harmful role 
for society and economy as corruption is very, very contagious. So, instead of cur-
ing our weak institutions, this “virus,” we may contaminate other ecosystems in 
the European Union, particularly with well-developed social ties and post-commu-
nist past.
In order to make more EE stakeholders aware of how dangerous politi-
cal entrepreneurship is, the task for scholars, entrepreneurs, and policymak-
ers. More research is needed on understanding the artificial mechanisms that 
impede market tools of doing business and resolving problems by “greas-
ing the wheels” of authorities. The economic impact still requires further 
investigation.
Further research will directly bring the role of formal institutions that need to 
ensure the rule of law in a country and how it changes, greasing authorities and 
entrepreneurs’ wheels.
1 3
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Appendix 2
Supplementary Information The online version contains supplementary material available at https:// doi. 
org/ 10. 1007/ s11365- 021- 00750-w.
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